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The perceived decline of American-led 
unipolar is inseparable from the rising 
China’s international status in the last few 
decades. This issue has spurred debates over 
what international peace and security might 
look like amidst the situation. Since then, 
China has become one of the most popular 
themes in international security studies. 
Many scholars have published a lot of articles 
and books with regards to address 
fundamental questions such as what best 
explanation to comprehend China 
international policy and its effects on 
international security following its rise. 
Lukas K. Danner, a Research Associate at the 
Miami-Florida Jean Monnet Center of 
Excellence Florida International University, 
is one of those scholars in this business. His 
recent book “China Grand Strategy: 
Contradictory Foreign Policy” (2018) 
discloses a new narrative to deal with the 
issue. While most other explanations are 
based on power transition theory and material 
factors, the book argues that a better way to 
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comprehend China international policy 
should not despise its cultural tenets among 
many considered variables.  
The book, which also an evolved version 
of Danner dissertation, assigns China Grand 
Strategy aspect namely “Peaceful Rise” –and 
due to controversy, later rearticulated as 
“Peaceful Development”, a vision set out in 
two white papers in 2005 and 2011 as its 
initial step of analysis and justification. Of 
which, Danner argues that China has had 
guidelines for being more friendly and 
defensive in term of its power in accordance 
to the published papers at which he 
breakdowns Peaceful Development grand 
strategy into seven key components, such as 
(1) defense of territorial integrity; (2) an 
increase of national power; (3) anti-
hegemonism; (4) maintenance of favorable 
economic markets; (5) international 
responsibility; (6) avoidance of China threat 
misperception; and (7) improving China’s 
international reputation. However, as Danner 
observe several international cases involving 
China in the analyzed time frame from 2009 
to 2017, ambivalence arises. several cases 
studies ranging from diplomatic, economic to 
military indicate China’s inconsistency and 
contradictory by showing assertive behavior 
in some cases, hence it is perceived that 
China has not seriously upheld its peaceful 
grand strategy or even in an extreme view its 
peaceful grand strategy is deceiving strategy 
to be exact. 
The observed assertive cases are as follow. 
First, the moment China supported Russian 
illegal annexation of Crimea in the Russo-
Ukranian conflict. In this case, China seems 
to extinguish the norm that is fought for so 
long namely the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and non-interference paradigm 
as it always views American intervention in 
other countries as illegal. Endorsing Russia 
annexation may not help to present a 
peacefully rising China. Second, China 
restriction of Rare Earths Export to Japan in 
response to the Chinese captain with his crew 
detention by Japan coast guard after the 
fishing boat collision near the disputed 
islands Diayou/Senkaku back in 2010. As its 
initial step, China issued a series of assertive 
behavior through diplomatic protests, later 
broadcasted harsh statements, cut off 
ministerial-level contacts, until refused to 
conduct a bilateral meeting. Therefore, it 
makes clearer that the restriction is not 
entirely economic based consideration. 
Third, as the reignited conflict over 
Senkaku/Diayou islands in 2012 did not find 
any solution, a year later China proclaimed a 
controversial Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea. From China 
perspective, it has the right to do so due to 
historical engagement with the territories. 
However, this unilateral and assertive 
behavior spurred another potential armed 
clash to spark, let alone the presence of the 
United States treaty alliance with Japan may 
lead to a catastrophic result. Hence even 
though China argument is to maintain 
territorial integrity, it remains prompt 
existing peace at risk. 
On the other hand, other cases show that 
China foreign policy is not as bad as most 
western eyes imagined. In Danner’s 
explanation, many of China diplomatic 
initiatives were peacefully undertaken yet 
contributed to international peace, security 
and prosperity such as the popular One Belt 
One Roads initiatives; peaceful engagement 
in Arctic Council where China is interested 
in, some of which, developing scientific 
cooperation, exploring resources and ending 
up global warming and the melting poles; as 
an active engager with international 
community to promote Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA); the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) establishment; up 
until its significant support for UN 
Peacekeeping Missions.  
By those cases in hand, Danner attempts to 
pave the way for a bigger strategic 
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framework that many eyes should 
comprehend. His arguments begin with the 
need to evaluate the grand strategy 
manifestation theoretically. Danner objects 
western understanding of grand strategy by 
stating that it underestimates cultural drivers 
in international relations. That grand strategy, 
which originally is based on realist 
assumption, lays and believes in survival and 
security as the core of state’s affairs. 
However, in China’s context, the most 
essential point is honor that can only be 
understood by culturalizing the grand 
strategy. From which, several concepts are 
counted, such as prestige, status, reputation, 
and recognition. It seems that Danner places 
himself as the one who does not believe 
China grand strategy is deceiving, but 
burdensome to internal factors.  
That previous theoretical framework has 
made sense to unlock state’s cultural and 
historical comprehension. In this respect, his 
argument set off from two past events which 
influence today China characteristic of 
international relations, such as its eagerness 
to regain hegemonic status in Asia roots from 
the hierarchical tributary system, from which 
honor, recognition, status, and reputation, are 
adhered; and its paranoia for being demeaned 
like the period of Century of Humiliation is 
in line with its active international efforts to 
maintain (liberal) order, increase its power 
yet against enemies once interrupted and 
humiliated China status and honor. 
To defend and achieve honor, according to 
Danner logic, China should meet two 
audiences, namely internal and external 
legitimacy. Here, the important contribution 
of the book is presented. His findings reveal 
that when the case is exclusively related to 
the pursuit of internal legitimacy (in this case: 
Ukraine Crisis, REEs and ADIZ) or pertain to 
China' national standard of honor, China’s 
behavior tends to be assertive and diverge 
from its Peaceful Development. On the other 
hand, if that grand strategy manifestation is 
related to external legitimacy (OBOR, AIIB, 
and UN Peacekeeping Missions) or the 
combination between internal and external 
legitimacy (Arctic Council, FTA, and Space 
Program) from which China gains its 
international prestige, status, recognition, and 
reputation, its behavior tend to be more 
peaceful. In sum, the book exemplifies the 
fact that when China grand strategy 
manifestations solely focus on internal 
legitimacy, the outward factors or external 
legitimacy inward-looking ignored and its 
coherence is eventually broken, making 
internal legitimacy or inward-looking factors 
are more likely to adhere. 
Overall, this book is quite interesting and 
important to some points. In my humble 
opinion, the way Danner constructs the 
theoretical argument is quite solid, 
combining cultural tenets to a general 
understanding of grand strategy is a creative 
idea yet contributive to the development of 
grand strategy discourse. Besides, the 
arrangement of data presentation of the book 
is quite simple, making it easier for readers to 
understand, notwithstanding international 
politics is a complicated arena. The way 
Danner addresses the validity of issues and 
the possibility of bias, as far as I concern, is 
moderately objective. It is so because he 
includes alternative explanations in each 
cases he observed. Sadly, I did not find 
satisfying reason in respect of why Danner 
exclude China behavior in the South China 
Sea until later I found that one of his 
objectives is to make sense western audience 
not to be caught up with the usual western 
bias. Therefore, as the book leaves 
unanswered questions such as whether 
Danner theory is correct, applicable or not to 
explain China contradictory behavior in 
Southeast Asia will be an interesting research 
theme for sure. 
In case Danner framework is used as a 
reference point to the South China Sea 
dispute settlements, we may consider that all 
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diplomatic initiatives within ASEAN 
mechanisms aimed at stopping China 
assertive behavior will be fruitless due to its 
important function to raise nationalistic 
sentiments and CCP prestige (internal 
legitimacy). Therefore I argue that 
Indonesian military should make sure its 
naval and air power development meets all 
defense requirements to operate in its 
outermost  zone  since  China  territorial claim  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seems uncertain. Diplomatically, as efforts to 
demilitarize the disputed islands seems 
impossible, the remaining choice now is to 
hold China militarization as long as possible 
for the sake of regional stability. Engaging 
China in a friendly manner may still be a wise 
choice yet diplomat or relevant actors must 
find a way to create such strategic steps that 
benefit regional stability but do not degrade 
China sense of honor in all respects. 
